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Abstract:	 This	 paper	 considers	 whether	 universally—for	 all	 (known)	 rational	 be-
ings—an	argument	scheme	or	pattern	can	go	 from	being	cogent	 (well-reasoned)	 to	
fallacious. This question has previously received little attention, despite the centrality 
of the concepts of cogency, scheme, and fallaciousness. I argue that cogency has van-
ished in this way for the following scheme, a common type of impersonal means-end 
reasoning: X is needed as a basic necessity or protection of human lives, therefore, X 
ought to be secured if possible. As it stands (with no further elaboration), this scheme 
is committed to the assumption that the greater the number of human lives, the bet-
ter. Although this assumption may have been indisputable previously, it is clearly 
disputable now. It is a fallacy or non sequitur to make a clearly disputable assump-
tion	without	providing	any	justification.	Although	this	topic	raises	critical	issues	for	
practically every discipline, my primary focus is on logical (as opposed to empirical 
or ethical) aspects of the case, and on implications for practical and theoretical logic. 
I	conclude	that	the	profile	of	vanishing	cogency	of	the	scheme	may	be	unique	and	is	
determined by a peculiar combination of contingent universality and changing condi-
tions.
Keywords: Cogency, fallacy, argument scheme, context-dependency, population 
ethics.
Resumen:	Este	trabajo	considera	si	universalmente	–para	todos	los	seres	raciona-
les–	un	esquema	o	patrón	argumentativo	puede	cambiar	de	ser	cogente	(bien	razona-
do) a falaz. Esta pregunta ha recibido poca atención anteriormente, a pesar de la cen-
tralidad de los conceptos de fuerza lógica, esquema y falacia. Sostengo que la cogencia 
ha desaparecido de esta manera para el siguiente esquema, un tipo común de razona-
miento	impersonal	de	medios-fines:	se	necesita	X	como	una	necesidad	básica	o	pro-
tección	de	la	vida	humana,	por	lo	tanto,	X	debe	ser	asegurado	si	es	posible.	Tal	como	
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está (sin más elaboración), este esquema se compromete con la suposición de que cu-
anto mayor sea el número de vidas humanas, mejor es el caso. Aunque este supuesto 
puede haber sido indiscutible anteriormente, es claramente discutible ahora. Es un 
error o incongruencia hacer de una suposición algo que es claramente discutible, sin 
dar	ninguna	justificación.	A	pesar	de	que	este	tema	plantea	cuestiones	críticas	para	
prácticamente todas las disciplinas, mi objetivo principal radica en el problema lógico 
(en oposición a problemas empíricos o éticos), y en las implicaciones para la lógica 
práctica	y	teórica.	Llego	a	la	conclusión	de	que	el	perfil	de	la	desaparición	de	la	cogen-
cia del esquema puede ser único y está determinado por una combinación peculiar de 
la contingente universalidad y las condiciones cambiantes.
Palabras clave: Cogencia, falacia, esquema argumentativo, contexto-dependencia, 
ética de poblaciones.
1. Introduction
My question is not whether the cogency of instances of an argument scheme 
or	pattern	may	vary	depending	on	the	specific	contexts	in	which	the	scheme	
appears, as is true of, for example, the argument from authority. Rather, I 
am	asking	whether	universally—for	all	(known)	rational	beings—a	scheme	
can go from being cogent (well-reasoned) to fallacious. So far as I can tell, 
the question has never been asked quite this way in relevant literature be-
fore, nor conversely has it been asked whether a scheme can universally go 
from being fallacious to cogent. This situation seems odd, given the cen-
trality of the concepts of cogency, scheme, and fallaciousness.
Yet the phenomenon does appear to be possible. A case can be made 
that cogency has vanished for the following scheme, a common type of 
impersonal means-end reasoning that I will call the “Humanization Argu-
ment”:
Humanization Argument
X is needed as a basic necessity or protection of human lives.
Therefore, X ought to be secured if possible.
Instantiations abound, for example:
The World Food Program appealed Friday for food aid for Cambodian 
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flood	victims,	saying	that	with	the	price	of	rice	on	the	rise,	the	poorest	
households face the prospect of not having enough to eat. [https://www.
wfp.org/content/wfp-appeals-food-aid-cambodian-flood-victims]
The	Microsoft	founder	and	philanthropist	said	five	or	six	new	vaccines	
could be available by the end of the decade and urged pharmaceutical 
manufacturers	to	make	them	affordable	for	poor	countries.
“If donors are generous, we will prevent 4 million deaths by 2015. By 
2020,	 we	 can	 prevent	 10	million	 deaths,”	 Gates,	 co-chair	 of	 the	 Bill	
and Melinda Gates Foundation, said. [http://www.reuters.com/arti-
cle/2011/05/17/us-gates-idUSTRE74G2D520110517]
This topic may be unpleasant or uncomfortable to discuss, but since it 
raises critical issues for practically every discipline, including informal log-
ic, please bear with me. My primary focus will be on how good logically (as 
opposed to empirically or ethically) the case is that cogency has vanished 
for the Humanization Argument, and as I think the case is a reasonable 
one, what implications this has for practical and theoretical logic. Hence, 
this paper has a dual purpose: to evaluate the Humanization Argument 
and to consider consequences for logic.
If cogency has vanished for the Humanization Argument scheme, then 
although historical instantiations were always or typically cogent, current 
instantiations	are	never	cogent—no	matter	what	the	instantiation,	that	is,	
no matter what the value of the variable X.
As indicated, my contrasting example of how cogency normally varies 
with	context—selected	for	no	particular	reason	other	than	relative	clarity—
is the argument from authority, or what Walton, Reed, & Macagno (2008, 
p. 310) call
ARGUMENT	FROM	EXPERT	OPINION
Major Premise: Source E is an expert in subject domain S containing 
proposition A.
Minor Premise: E asserts that proposition A is true (false).
Conclusion: A is true (false).
Even given that the premises are true, how good such an inference is will 
vary considerably with the value of the variables from context to context, 
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depending on how familiar E is with the particular content of proposition 
A and any issues surrounding that content, how honest or trustworthy E is, 
and so on. This applies equally to the past and to the present. There is no 
case to be made that although historical instantiations of this pattern were 
always or typically cogent, no current instantiation is cogent.
2. Some Remarks on Cogency and Fallaciousness
Since these terms do not have universally accepted meanings in logic and 
informal logic, it is necessary to say what I mean by them, and doing this 
will be to some degree stipulative: I take a cogent argument to be any well-
reasoned argument and a fallacious argument to be any poorly reasoned 
one. So I understand these terms to have opposite meanings. For me the 
concepts of cogency and fallaciousness pertain “only to an argument’s rea-
soning or logic, not also to the truth value of its propositional elements (un-
like	the	technical	concept	of	soundness),”	and	they	pertain	to	both	deduc-
tive and nondeductive arguments (Plumer, 1999, p. 43; see also my 2001, 
e.g., p. 174). On the other hand, a good argument is one that is cogent, and 
all of its propositional elements are true. In short, I take cogency to be the 
broader notion of proper reasoning as compared to the technical concept 
of validity. Since for nondeduction the strength of support that the prem-
ises provide the conclusion may vary from argument to argument, cogency 
comes in degrees ranging from (as we say) a ‘perfectly cogent’ argument 
to a ‘barely cogent’ argument, just as does the seriousness of informal fal-
laciousness (although generally there will be no need to make use of these 
degrees in this paper). The cogency-fallaciousness dichotomy can be re-
garded as exhaustive, since less cogency than ‘barely cogent’ seems to mean 
that the premises provide the conclusion no support, and hence the argu-
ment is fallacious. Perhaps more illuminating, though, is to notice that an 
argument may be cogent and fallacious (well- and poorly reasoned) at the 
same	time	 in	different	respects,	 for	example,	a	question-begging,	deduc-
tively valid argument that has its conclusion also as a premise.
Depending on how the constituent notions are explicated, we can agree 
with Johnson & Blair’s (1977) “well-known and widely accepted RSA crite-
ria	for	argument	cogency:	the	premises	are	to	be	relevant,	sufficient,	and	
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acceptable”	(Paglieri,	2015,	p.	70),	if	acceptability	is	clearly	distinguished	
from truth (as in Govier, 2010, p. 108, in contrast to Adler, 2006, p. 225). 
An argument is fallacious if and only if it does not meet one or more of 
these criteria, which is not necessarily the same thing as saying that it com-
mits	a	fallacy—as	that	term	is	often	used.	Unlike	fallaciousness,	fallacies	are	
quantified	over	and	some	even	have	particular	names	(e.g.,	‘equivocation’).	
This	difference	appears	to	have	led	some	to	postulate	psychological	or	sta-
tistical	requirements—which	are	eschewed	in	this	paper—in	the	definition	
of	the	notion	of	fallacy.	These	tend	to	be	variations	on	the	“seem”	element	
in	Copi’s	definition	of	“a	fallacy	as	a	type	of	argument	that	may	seem	to	be	
correct	but	which	proves,	upon	examination,	not	 to	be	 so”	 (1978,	p.	87)	
or Johnson’s requirement that the type of incorrect reasoning occur “with 
sufficient	frequency	in	discourse	to	warrant	being	baptized”	(1987,	p.	246).	
While the cogency or fallaciousness of deductive reasoning is essentially 
a matter of its form, this is not the case for nondeduction. As Salmon indi-
cates, nondeductive reasoning is (basically what I call) cogent if “the argu-
ment has a correct form, and … the premises of the argument embody all 
available	relevant	evidence”	(1973,	p.	91).	This	difference	between	deduc-
tion and nondeduction means that the concepts of cogency and fallacious-
ness directly apply only to instantiations of a nondeductive form or scheme, 
and to the scheme itself only by extension if the instances are always or 
typically	cogent	or	fallacious—as	the	case	may	be.	As	Johnson	&	Blair	say,	
“with few exceptions [including formal fallacies], the patterns of argument 
that	are	liable	to	be	fallacious	need	not	always	be	so”	(2006,	p.	xv).
It is important to emphasize that (Plumer, 1999, p. 43)
in no case is cogency purely a matter of formal validity. For example, 
adding the stated conclusion or the contradictory of a stated premise 
to the stated premises would make any argument formally valid. But 
the argument would lack cogency insofar as it grossly begs the question 
or engages in self-contradiction. In order to be fully cogent, it seems an 
argument must not commit any informal fallacy…
Given this, it is false that “valid arguments remain a subclass of cogent 
arguments	…	valid	arguments	are	always	cogent”	(Goddu,	2004,	p.	31),	al-
though valid arguments that commit no informal fallacy are a subclass of 
cogent arguments. We will return to this point in section 4.
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3. The Case that Cogency has Vanished for the Humanization 
 Argument
 
My case that cogency has vanished for the Humanization Argument has 
three main steps, (A), (B), and (C), as follows: 
(A) As it stands (with no further elaboration), the Humanization Argument 
is committed to the assumption that the greater the number of human 
lives, the better.
(B) Although this assumption may have been indisputable previously, it is 
clearly disputable now. 
(C) It is a fallacy or non sequitur to make a clearly disputable assumption 
without	providing	any	justification.
Regarding step (A), surely the Humanization Argument’s conclusion 
is not (and has never been) adequately supported by its stated premise 
alone. There is a huge gap, for example, between Gates’ saying that mil-
lions of human deaths could be prevented by having certain new vaccines, 
and inferring that donors should be generous, including pharmaceutical 
manufacturers	making	them	affordable	for	“poor	countries.”	Without	some	
assumption	addressing	the	gap,	the	Humanization	Argument	would	flatly	
exhibit the classic pattern of ‘the naturalistic fallacy’, wherein an ‘ought’ is 
attempted to be directly derived from an ‘is’, as in “all the vulgar systems of 
morality”	(David	Hume,	A Treatise of Human Nature, III, I, I). So, apply-
ing a principle of charity is in order, which means that the Humanization 
Argument is to be understood as an enthymematic argument making some 
implicit	assumption(s)	to	fill	the	gap.
For all the world, the assumption looks to me like the greater the num-
ber of human lives, the better (or something equivalent). Certainly, this 
would	address	 (if	not	fill)	 the	 gap.	 If	 this	were	not	on	 the	 right	 track,	 it	
would not only be harsh, it would be irrelevant to object to Gate’s argu-
ment by questioning whether the world needs 10 million more people. Yet 
it is not irrelevant.
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 It is true that for the two instantiations cited in section 1, the stated 
premise is not cast in terms of increasing the number of human lives gener-
ally, but rather in terms of saving lives or preventing deaths in two particu-
lar	 sets	 of	 circumstances	 (the	Cambodian	flood	and	vaccine	unavailabil-
ity	in	certain	“poor	countries”).	But	there	are	two	critical	things	to	notice	
about this. First, in these two typical instantiations of the (unelaborated) 
Humanization Argument, there is not (even) an intimation of a reason 
specific to the Cambodian case or to the case of unvaccinated people as to 
why their lives should be saved or their deaths prevented. Nor is there any 
intimation of a reason why we might be broadly obligated to save human 
lives or prevent human deaths, let alone an intimation of any restriction on 
this obligation. Therefore, since there is nothing in these arguments that 
would justify attributing a narrower implicit assumption to them, so far as 
this goes we are left with the interpretation that these arguments take for 
granted the vague and general proposition that we are obligated to save hu-
man lives or prevent deaths (or something equivalent).1
Second, saving lives or preventing deaths in such circumstances has the 
direct	and	obvious	effect	of	increasing	the	overall	number	of	human	lives	
(on Earth) from the lower number that there otherwise would be if the val-
ue of the variable X is not provided or undertaken, other things being equal 
(ceteris paribus). This engenders commitment to the proposition that the 
greater the number of human lives, the better.
It might be claimed instead that in using the Humanization Argument 
one	need	take	for	granted	only	that	human	suffering	ought	to	be	reduced	
or prevented. But even if true, this would imply the same commitment, 
although it is a small step removed. Reducing or preventing human suf-
fering by providing or undertaking the value of the variable X—since	do-
1	The	interpretive	principle	at	work	here,	viz.,	that	given	specificity	determines	the	nar-
rowness of the implicit assumption, is defended in some detail in my 1999, section III. In 
that paper I develop and defend general criteria for determining necessary assumptions of 
arguments,	which	would	take	us	too	far	afield	to	fully	reiterate	here.	Suffice	it	to	say	that	
I	 found	that	 in	determining	such	assumptions,	one	first	applies	 the	principle	of	charity,	
and only if this indicates that the argument is not irredeemably fallacious does one apply 
the other criteria, including that a necessary assumption must not be a presupposition of 
rationality generally or of a premise or the conclusion of the argument.
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ing	that	involves	saving	lives	or	preventing	deaths—will	have	the	obvious	
and	possibly	immediate	effect	of	increasing	the	number	of	human	lives	as	
compared to what there otherwise would be (ceteris paribus). Thus, it still 
seems that there is commitment to the proposition in question. There is no 
logical cover for such an obvious consequence since it is largely conceptual 
or analytic. 
There	 are	 both	 similarities	 and	 differences	 between	 the	 principle	 at	
work here and the idea that logical consequences are substitutable inside 
the scope of ‘ought’, that is, what is called “the deontic closure principle, ac-
cording to which we ought to do something whenever our doing it logically 
follows	from	our	doing	something	else	we	ought	to	do.”	Although	the	de-
ontic closure principle has regularly been defended, it warrants inferences 
that many regard as paradoxical, such as from ‘you ought to mail the letter’ 
to ‘you ought to mail the letter or burn it’, and indeed to ‘if you burn the 
letter, then you do something that you ought to do’ (Kiesewetter, 2015, pp. 
924-925; Hansen, 2006, pp. 221-222). However, the relation in the princi-
ple I am invoking is being a direct and obvious effect of, other things being 
equal, which is hardly logical entailment. The idea as applied here is that 
given that we are broadly obligated to save human lives or prevent deaths, 
we are obligated to increase the number of human lives generally (or: the 
greater the number of people, the better), since doing the latter will be a 
direct	and	obvious	effect	of	doing	the	former,	other	things	being	equal.	In	
theory, the extent to which this ceteris paribus clause obtains is dependent 
on any number of contingencies (so of course the relation cannot be that 
of logical consequence). But in fact, as almost everyone knows, the world’s 
human population has been increasing dramatically (some details below), 
which is a plain indication that other things have been more or less equal.
At this point, the deontologist or Kantian might object as follows: ‘Peo-
ple	must	be	treated	as	ends-in-themselves,	so	when	I	see	human	suffering,	
I try to alleviate it; for me, the consequences are strictly irrelevant. There-
fore, when I use the Humanization Argument, there is no commitment to 
any such proposition as the greater the number of human lives, the better’. 
This extreme deontological orientation could be argued to be ethically ir-
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responsible, but it can also be contended that it is argumentatively irre-
sponsible if it is kept hidden. As Johnson & Blair indicate, when necessary, 
“an arguer ought to expand his or her case out of respect for … the norms 
of	reasonable	belief”	(2006,	p.	xv;	cf.	Johnson	2000).	Thus,	unless	there	
is some sort of elaboration in the presentation of the Humanization Argu-
ment indicating that the assumption in question is being defeated or over-
ridden (or narrowed), I conclude that the argument is committed to that 
assumption, whether or not the arguer fully intends it. Compare another 
‘salvation’ argument scheme, viz., simply declaring ‘Y is a land of purely in-
digenous culture. Therefore, Y ought to be Christianized if possible’ (as one 
can imagine was the wont of Isabella or Ferdinand, e.g.). Willy nilly, there 
is commitment to the assumption that the greater the number of Chris-
tians, the better, or that Christianization is a good thing.
Regarding	 step	 (B),	 the	 assumption—the	 greater	 the	 number	 of	 hu-
man	lives,	the	better—may	have	been	indisputable,	for	example,	in	1690,	
when John Locke indicated that “the wild woods and uncultivated waste of 
America”	should	be	populated	(Two Treatises of Government, II, 5, 37). 
But conditions have changed radically since Locke’s time. For purposes of 
making the case that cogency has vanished for the (unelaborated) Human-
ization Argument, all that is needed is to show that the assumption in ques-
tion is now clearly problematic or disputable, not that it is disproven. This 
is	directly	a	matter	of	its	epistemic	status	(or	if	you	like,	its	“acceptability”),	
not its truth value.
It is hard to see how any aware person could deny that the assumption 
has this problematic character in the face of overwhelming evidence to the 
contrary.	Very	briefly,	should	anyone	need	reminding,	this	evidence	con-
sists of facts such as the following: There has been a ten-fold, exponential 
increase in the world’s human population since Locke’s time. Carbon diox-
ide	emissions	into	the	atmosphere	from	human	artifices	have	correspond-
ingly but more dramatically increased, as exhibited in Figure 1.
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Figure 1.
Source: https://www.worldof7billion.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/generating-heat.pdf 
The US National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), one of 
many governmental agencies notoriously subject to political pressure to 
be conservative, says “for 650,000 years, atmospheric CO2 has never been 
above”	300	parts	per	million	(ppm)—until	1950,	that	is;	and	“in	2013,	CO2 
levels	surpassed	400	ppm.”	In	addition,	NASA	says	“If	fossil-fuel	burning	
continues at a business-as-usual rate, such that humanity exhausts the re-
serves over the next few centuries, CO2 will continue to rise to levels of or-
der of 1500 ppm. The atmosphere would then not return to pre-industrial 
levels	even	tens	of	thousands	of	years	into	the	future”	[http://climate.nasa.
gov/climate_resources/24/]. Aside from being a greenhouse gas, there is 
even evidence that increasing levels of atmospheric CO2 are contributing to 
the obesity epidemic (Hersoug, Sjödin, & Astrup, 2012).
From the 21 July 2015 US Public Broadcasting System (PBS) docu-
mentary Humanity from Space [http://www.pbs.org/program/humanity-
from-space//]: Currently, “to feed us takes almost half of the land on the 
planet,”	which	is	“pretty	much	all	of	the	arable	land	in	the	world	.…	We’re	
going to build more cities in the next 40 years than we built in all of human 
history	.…	Our	energy	needs	are	predicted	to	double	by	2050.”	Some	of	this	
energy is provided by (bird-slicing) wind-turbine farms, as well as by (bird-
incinerating) solar power stations, such as the world’s largest at Ivanpah, 
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California, which radically altered 4,000 acres of natural landscape in or-
der	to	provide	power	to	a	mere	“140,000	homes.”	Of	the	world’s	population	
of	 “7.3	billion	as	of	July	2015	…	worldwide	coastal	flooding	 threatens	 to	
invade	up	to	a	billion	people	by	2050.”
Madness? Perhaps. At this juncture it might be useful to recall Paul R. 
Ehrlich’s notorious (1968) predictions that there would be mass human 
starvation in the 1970s and 1980s due to overpopulation, including 65 mil-
lion in the United States, and that there was a good chance that “England 
will	not	exist	in	the	year	2000.”	This	serves	to	underscore	the	earlier	point	
that	all	that	is	needed	is	to	show	that	the	assumption—the	greater	the	num-
ber	of	human	lives,	 the	better—is	now	clearly	problematic	or	disputable,	
not that it is disproven. What may be the most mature view on such matters 
is expressed by the distinguished anthropologist Joseph A. Tainter (2006, 
p. 72):
Neoclassical economists assume that, with incentives and unfettered 
markets, there will always be new technologies and new resources. 
Humanity, in this view, need never face a crisis of overpopulation or 
overconsumption. The contrary view is well known: We must reduce our 
ecological footprint or eventually collapse. The neoclassical argument is 
based on faith that markets will always work and denial of diminishing 
returns to innovation… Should we base our future on faith and denial, 
or on rational planning?
Of course from factual considerations alone, one cannot directly reason 
either for or against the value proposition/assumption that the greater the 
number of human lives, the better. One needs an ethical theory, at least 
operating in the background, or else the naturalistic fallacy is committed. 
So	let	us	briefly	consider	in	this	connection	what	is	perhaps	the	most	wide-
ly accepted ethical theory. It advocates ‘the greatest good for the greatest 
number’, i.e., that good should be maximized in the world and distributed 
as widely as possible (this is a utilitarian consequentialist theory mixed 
with	 a	 deontological	 principle—that	 of	 distributive	 justice).	 Typically,	
‘good’	here	 is	defined	as	pleasure	or	happiness,	and	the	claim	underpin-
ning the assumption in question would be that the more people there are, 
the greater the net amount and distribution of pleasure or happiness there 
is in the world. The foregoing considerations do apply directly to this claim. 
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The claim may have been indisputable in previous times, but not now, giv-
en facts on the order of those cited. A reasonable case (at least) could be 
made that currently and for the foreseeable future, the more people there 
are, the greater is the balance and distribution of human (not to mention, 
animal) suffering over pleasure or happiness. And a reasonable case is all 
that is needed to show that the assumption in question is clearly disputable 
now.	The	issue	here	of	course	revolves	around	what	Parfit	(1984)	famously	
called	“the	Repugnant	Conclusion”	of	utilitarianism,	i.e.,	that	we	are	mor-
ally	obliged	to	create	more	people—up	to	a	point.
Another possible underpinning from ethics and value theory for the as-
sumption would be something like the claim that human lives themselves 
have intrinsic value (instead of or in addition to pleasure or happiness), so 
the more people there are, the more intrinsic value there is in the world. 
The	difficulty	here	 is	finding	any	 support	 for	 the	 idea	 that	 sheer	 greater	
number is a good thing, without appeal to religious constructions such as 
souls—and	even	there,	it	is	unclear	why	many would be intrinsically bet-
ter than some (especially	if	each	has	‘infinite’	value).	The	same	applies	to	
minds, although of course and up to a point, harnessing more minds tends 
to be better than fewer in the instrumental achievement of many ends. Of-
ten,	knowledge—in	 the	Popperian	 sense	of	objective	knowledge	 that	 can	
reside	in	books,	computer	drives,	etc.	(Popper,	1972)—and	beauty	(natu-
ral	 and	artificial)	 are	plausibly	 said	 to	be	 intrinsic	 values.	With	more	or	
less the same resources distributed among fewer people, almost everyone 
might	have	a	chance	to	significantly	contribute	to	knowledge.	And	unques-
tionably, natural beauty has been under assault in proportion to human 
population	levels,	where	“pretty	much	all	of	the	arable	land	in	the	world”	
now being under cultivation is just one example. Diversity of life is another 
plausible candidate for being an intrinsic value, yet this is hardly the same 
thing as sheer amount of life (of a single species). Sometimes autonomy or 
freedom is held to be an intrinsic value, but this appears either to cut no 
(melting) ice one way or the other since the absolute amount of autonomy 
in the world is not relevant, or it is a confused expression of the Kantian 
point that rationality requires that any given person be treated with respect 
or as an end in him- or herself (not that the greater the number of ends-in-
themselves in the world, the better).
The	view	most	strongly	suggested	by	this—admittedly	whirlwind—con-
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sideration of intrinsic value is one of balance, and abandonment of the self-
serving notion that humanity is the source and locus of all such value.
The last step in the case that cogency has vanished for the Humaniza-
tion Argument is (C), viz., that it is a fallacy or non sequitur to make a clear-
ly	disputable	assumption	without	providing	any	justification.	To	make	an	
implicit assumption in an argument is to take the proposition for granted. 
It might be a rare argument where this is not done. However, the negative 
sense of argumentative ‘taking for granted’ arises when, as in the Human-
ization Argument, the proposition is in fact not granted in that it is clearly 
problematic or disputable. Then making the assumption without provid-
ing	 any	 justification,	 as	 in	 the	 (unelaborated)	Humanization	 Argument,	
renders the argument fallacious. I do not think that this is controversial 
theory. As Hansen says, “we have been aware all along that an argument is 
a	weak	one	if	it	has	a	problematic	undefended	premise”	(2003,	p.	2;	cf.,	e.g.,	
Finocchiaro’s	1987	discussion	of	“presuppositional	fallaciousness,”	esp.	p.	
269, and Macagno & Damele, 2013, p. 363: “Why is it not possible to take…
an	unacceptable	premise	for	granted?”).	On	the	USA-produced	Law	School	
Admission Test (LSAT), ‘taking for granted’ or ‘presuming without pro-
viding	justification’	constitute	one	established	category	of	reasoning	flaw	
(identified	as	such	by	question	stems)	that	examinees	are	required	to	spot,	
and test preparation companies attempt to tutor this skill (e.g., Manhattan 
Prep: https://www.manhattanprep.com/lsat/blog/2012/05/09/the-mor-
bid-flaws/). Again, this is a matter of the assumption’s epistemic status, 
not its truth value; it concerns what authors mean or should mean by “ac-
ceptability”	of	premises	in	the	RSA	criteria	for	argument	cogency.	Having	
a false assumption makes for a bad argument; having an undefended as-
sumption that is very possibly or probably false in view of the evidence at 
hand makes for a fallacious argument.
Nevertheless, controversy has arisen when such points are cast as fol-
lows, for example: “there is actually in some sense a failure of argumenta-
tive responsibility … if the arguer does not respond to objections that have 
been voiced, or even to objections that might reasonably be anticipated, 
given	the	expressed	alternative	views	on	the	issue	in	question”	(Johnson	&	
Blair, 2006, p. xv; cf. Johnson, 2000). For, where will this end? As Govier 
urges	(1999,	Ch.	13),	 this	 looks	 like	devolution	into	an	infinite	regress	of	
“dialectical	 tiers”	 of	 responses	 to	 objections,	 responses	 to	 objections	 to	
Can Cogency Vanish? / g. pluMer
102
those	first	 responses,	 responses	 to	objections	 to	 those	second	responses,	
and so on. Yet we can’t have a responsibility or be obligated to do what is 
impossible. 
As indicated, this problem arises partly because of an unnecessary (in 
this	context)	shift	in	perspective	from	the	more	objective	or	extensional—
what	makes	for	a	“weak”	argument—to	the	more	subjective	or	intensional—
“failure”	of	a	person’s	 “argumentative	 responsibility.”	But	 this	 is	not	 the	
whole story. It should come as no revelation that in the formulation of base 
arguments and equally in the formulation of responses to possible objec-
tions to those arguments, proof must stop somewhere, at least temporarily, 
relative to the purposes and circumstances at hand. These are propositions 
excepted from the burden of proof that allow proof to begin. As Wittgen-
stein says in On Certainty (343), “we just can’t investigate everything, and 
for that reason we are forced to rest content with assumption. If I want the 
door	to	turn,	the	hinges	must	stay	put.”	The	idea	seems	to	be	practically	a	
truism, but in any case, all I am saying here in these terms with respect to 
the Humanization Argument is that it takes the assumption in question to 
be such a given, and it is no longer entitled to do that.
4. Implications 
So the case that cogency has vanished for the Humanization Argument ap-
pears to be a reasonable one. What are the implications of this for practical 
and theoretical logic? 
From the loss of cogency for the Humanization Argument, there are no 
such dramatic implications as that people should be allowed to starve. Such 
practices would violate ethical precepts, as can be inferred from preceding 
discussion, particularly the Kantian strain that people must be treated as 
ends-in-themselves. Rather, the main practical implication is that one can-
not	any	longer	simply	offer	an	instantiation	of	the	Humanization	Argument	
as	if	it	were	good	reasoning	on	its	own;	it	needs	to	be	modified	with	at least 
a hint of how concomitantly human population growth and spread might 
be reduced, pollution controlled, or natural beauty and diversity of life pre-
served or restored. That is, there needs be at least a modicum or gesture in 
the	direction	of	what	we	saw	Tainter	call	“rational	planning.”	To	be	sure,	
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often this requirement is met by virtue of notions present in the context in 
which the Humanization Argument appears, as for example when part of 
the purpose of providing necessity X is to help lift people out of poverty to 
the point where they no longer feel the need to have so many children as a 
safety net. Perhaps more often, however, the requirement is not met at all. 
In this regard, one cannot avoid thinking of charities recklessly acting in 
accordance with the personal whims of their billionaire founders. 
Let us consider the implications for theoretical (and mostly informal) 
logic in connection with two questions: What logically relevant factors have 
allowed cogency to vanish for the Humanization Argument? And, are there 
other argument schemes for which cogency has vanished (or materialized, 
for that matter)?
I think the factor that both allowed cogency to vanish and that indicates 
there may be no other such argument schemes is the distinctive universal-
ity of the relevance of radically changed conditions for the Humanization 
Argument. These radically changed conditions pertain to all (known) ratio-
nal beings. The argument scheme accommodates instantiation at any time 
by anyone, for any sensible value of X, and with respect to any general set 
of human lives (although there are extenuating circumstances wherein it 
would be counterproductive or even inconsistent to use it, e.g., in wartime 
with respect to an enemy). But conditions have changed so much on Earth 
that	current	 instantiations	of	 the	(unmodified)	scheme	are	never	cogent,	
even	if	they	are	offered	by,	say,	a	dwindling	Amazonian	tribe	with	respect	to	
themselves—although	an	addition	here	about	contribution	to	the	diversity	
of	life	and	a	zero-polluting	lifestyle	would	probably	be	more	than	sufficient.	
Conversely, if conditions radically reversed, as with a pandemic of deadly 
flu,	cogency	could	return	to	the	Humanization	Argument.	
Contrast the most similar scheme in Walton, et al’s large compendium 
of schemes (2008, p. 334):
ARGUMENT FROM DISTRESS
Premise 1: Individual x	is	in	distress	(is	suffering).
Premise 2: If y brings about A, it will relieve or help to relieve this dis-
tress.
Conclusion: Therefore, y ought to bring about A. 
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Unlike the Humanization Argument, the Argument from Distress concerns 
relations between individuals and appears to involve what are called spe-
cial ethical obligations,	 as	 between	 individuals	who	 are	 “close”	 in	 some	
way (e.g., relatives or friends) or as might be entailed by one’s job. No such 
implicit assumption or premise as that the greater the number of human 
lives, the better, is needed to avoid the naturalistic fallacy, etc. Thus, the 
radically	changed	circumstances	on	Earth	are	of	no	significant	import.
As we saw earlier in section 2, the claim that “valid arguments are al-
ways	 cogent”	 is	 false.	 Indeed,	with	 the	 assumption	 in	 question,	 the	Hu-
manization Argument is basically a deductively valid enthymeme. In this 
respect, then, it cannot be that non-monotonicity allowed its cogency to 
vanish—yet	would	it	not	be	this	very	property	that	means	the	reasoning	is	
‘defeasible’ or ‘fragile’? To sort out the answer to this question, consider the 
following	standard	definitions	(Sainsbury,	1991,	p.	369):
Deductive validity is … monotonic. That is, if you start with a deduc-
tively valid argument, then, no matter what you add to the premises, 
you will end up with a deductively valid argument. Inductive strength is 
not monotonic: adding premises to an inductively strong argument can 
turn it into an inductively weak one.
Applying	 these	definitions,	 the	answer	or	 clarification	 is	 that	 cogency	 it-
self is non-monotonic because well-reasoned inductive arguments, in 
company with all other well-reasoned arguments of any kind (deductive 
or nondeductive), form proper subsets of cogent arguments. Cogency is 
non-monotonic in that if you start with a cogent argument, then if you add 
information to the premises (or add new premises), you may end up with 
a fallacious argument. The question of whether it is monotonic arises for 
any consequence relation, and being a consequence relation is a respect in 
which validity, inductive strength, and cogency are all on par.
 Under current conditions indicated above, together with presumed 
ethical theory, we have been treating the Humanization Argument’s rea-
soning as having become fallacious or ‘defeated’ because the assumption in 
question has become clearly disputable. In this way, we have been treating 
its cogency as context-dependent. Alternatively, and more strictly in line 
with	the	preceding	clarification,	we	could	add	information	about	current	
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conditions and their ethical import to the Argument’s premise set, in which 
case you get an argument that is fallacious because it is inconsistent. 
What appears to be special about the cogency of the Humanization Ar-
gument scheme is that its context-dependency is temporal only; its cogency 
or fallaciousness is spatially invariant over any place it is instantiated at a 
given time. Heretofore, I believe the only kind of argument context-depen-
dency directly considered by logicians has been both temporal and spa-
tial, or the absence of any such dependency (validity). Of course, however, 
philosophically speaking the spatial invariance for the Humanization Ar-
gument is a contingent	fact	reflecting	both	(a)	the	confinement	of	humans	
to Earth (should these bonds be broken, it might be that on other planets, 
the	greater	the	number	of	humans	lives,	the	better),	and	(b)	the	confine-
ment of rational beings to humans, if we take the essence of a human to be 
a rational being (if other rational beings existed here or elsewhere, it might 
be that the greater the number of those beings, the better). Although these 
contingencies are of little or no consequence for practical logic, they do 
have	the	theoretical	significance	that	the	spatial	invariance	of	the	vanishing	
cogency of the Humanization Argument is a contingent fact. 
Yet it may seem that we can imagine other comparable arguments with 
a key premise (explicit or implicit) that became, over time, clearly disput-
able or even known to be false, and whose cogency or fallaciousness is spa-
tially	invariant:	Shouldn’t	any	scientific	revolution	or	mathematical	discov-
ery provide the material? Well, not exactly, so far as I can determine. It ap-
pears	that	there	are	at	least	two	kinds	of	putative	cases	to	consider.	The	first	
one or two may be illustrated by the once-common argument that natural 
selection and evolution do not constitute a viable alternative to creationism 
because the Earth is only thousands of years old. Such a case in fact ap-
pears to be a single argument, historically often repeated, rather than a dis-
cernable argument scheme or form (with a variable(s) and instantiations) 
like the Humanization Argument. In further contrast to the Humanization 
Argument, in this argument spatial invariance is gained ‘on the cheap’ if 
you will; that is, spatial invariance is guaranteed by the appearance in the 
argument	of	an	essential	reference	that	fixes	applicability	to	a	specific	place	
(Earth). Compare this argument scheme: ‘The Earth is not warming, so we 
need	not	be	concerned	about	probable	causal	effect	Z’ (sea-level rise, gla-
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ciers melting, changing ocean currents, stronger hurricanes and typhoons, 
etc.). In addition, the cogency or fallaciousness of this particular scheme 
may be parasitic upon that of the Humanization Argument (see below).
The other kind of putatively comparable case is nicely illustrated by the 
Gambler’s Fallacy. There is no question that this is a spatially-invariant 
argument scheme with unlimited possible instantiations, and it has not 
always been regarded as fallacious. Here is an established nineteenth-cen-
tury logician endorsing the principle underlying the scheme in his logic 
textbook	(Coppee,	1874,	p.	162—cited	in	Siegel,	1992,	p.	33):
Thus, in throwing dice, we cannot be sure that any single face or combi-
nation of faces will appear, but if, in very many throws, some particular 
face has not appeared, the chances of its coming up are stronger and 
stronger, until they approach very near to certainty. It must come; and 
as each throw is made and it fails to appear, the certainty of its coming 
draws nearer and nearer.
The principle underlying the Gambler’s Fallacy was once thought to be 
true, but is now known to be false. The situation is similar with any number 
of other schemes, for example, a scheme that licenses concluding of two 
spatially separated events that they are (absolutely) simultaneous. Such a 
scheme is based on a principle that generally has been abandoned by physi-
cists in favor of Einstein’s Special Theory of Relativity (so for purposes of 
this discussion, I shall assume that the principle of absolute simultaneity 
is false).
Similar to the assumption in question made by the Humanization Ar-
gument, the epistemic status of the principle underlying the Gambler’s 
Fallacy and of the principle of absolute simultaneity changed from being 
acceptable to being unacceptable, and these changes of epistemic status 
are all the result of various contingencies. Nevertheless, there is a critical 
difference,	which	is	that	these	two	principles	were	always	false,	including	
when they were acceptable; indeed, they are timelessly, if not necessarily, 
false. In contrast, the case can be made that the epistemic status of the 
assumption—the	greater	the	number	of	human	lives,	the	better—changed	
more or less in sync with its truth value: under previous conditions it was 
acceptable and true, yet under current conditions it is neither. (This is a 
façon de parler. Speaking more precisely, since we want to avoid the view 
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that the truth value of the same proposition can change over time, we may 
take an instantiation of the Humanization Argument indexically to refer to 
conditions at the time of the instantiation, so not only is the cogency of the 
Humanization Argument temporally context dependent, instantiations at 
different	times	make	differently	indexed	versions	of	the	assumption,	some	
true and the others false.) Compare Allen (1998, p. 4): “the general point 
here is that the case for the acceptability of a premise may at the same time 
be, at least in part, a case for its truth, despite the fact that acceptability is 
not	the	same	thing	as	truth.”
 It should not be surprising that there would be synchronicity between 
epistemic status and truth value here; after all, the evidence for the truth or 
falsity of the assumption in question tends to be relatively straightforward 
and accessible: currently, almost everywhere we see expansion of industry 
and cities, pollution, loss of natural habitat and beauty, species extinction 
and loss of diversity of life, etc. Such evidence is perhaps orders of mag-
nitude less obscure than the evidence for the relativity of simultaneity of 
spatially separated events, for example. The more obvious the evidence at 
hand against an undefended (implicit or explicit) premise, the greater the 
seriousness of the argument’s fallaciousness. 
Thus,	the	profile	of	vanishing	cogency	of	the	Humanization	Argument	
scheme still looks unique; it is determined by a peculiar combination of 
contingent universality and changing conditions. It is worth mentioning, 
though, that doubtless there are other schemes whose cogency or falla-
ciousness is parasitic upon or a function of that of the Humanization Argu-
ment. For instance, imagine a scheme that relies on the assumption that 
the greater the number of fossil fuel power plants, the better. The cogency 
of	such	a	scheme	basically	stands	or	falls—or	rather	vanishes—with	that	of	
the Humanization Argument.
5. Conclusion
This paper has tried to answer the question of whether universally, an 
argument scheme can go from being cogent to fallacious, and what that 
might mean. This question has previously received little attention, despite 
the centrality of the concepts of cogency, scheme, and fallaciousness. We 
Can Cogency Vanish? / g. pluMer
108
saw that the phenomenon does seem possible and real in the case of the 
Humanization Argument, an argument scheme that raises critical issues 
for	 practically	 every	 discipline.	We	 saw	 that	 the	 profile	 of	 vanishing	 co-
gency for this argument scheme may be unique. I am not certain that I fully 
understand why. For all of these reasons, I do hope that this paper will help 
to begin a broader discussion of the issues it raises. 
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